

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #03852-84

5 July 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : [redacted]
Acting National Intelligence Officer for
General Purpose Forces

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SUBJECT : Briefing on Soviet Policy Interpretation by
Center for Naval Analysis [redacted]

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1. Last week we arranged through the CNO Executive Panel for a presentation to the NIC by research analysts from the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) on an alternative interpretation of the evolution of Soviet Naval Policy and some observations on cutting the lag in the recognition of change. Members of the SRP and various intelligence agency representatives were also invited. [redacted]

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2. CNA's briefing postulated that:

- Soviet warfighting doctrine is characterized by change rather than, as commonly believed, by constancy.
- These shifts in policy generally occur a couple of years prior to the five-year plan which begins to implement them:
 - (1960-65) all-out nuclear war;
 - (1966-70) a conventional local war in the Third World;
 - (1971-75) limited intercontinental nuclear warfare;
 - (1976-80) theater nuclear war;
 - (1981-85) protracted conventional war between the two coalitions.
- Manifestations of these decisions generally begin to be noticed long after the decision:
 - in open literature (2 years late);

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-- in construction (4-6 years late);

-- in exercises (5-10 years late).

- NIE's (using 11-15, Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs Through the 1990's, as an example) generally run 7 years late in recognizing these changes.

- We could do better by:

-- assuming change vice continuity;

-- closer examination of and giving more credence to Soviet writings;

-- extending estimates beyond initial wartime periods.

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3. While NIC attendees were generally receptive to the briefing, many visitors were quite hostile, viewing the presentation as incorrect, based on flimsy evidence, and an indictment of their contributions to past estimates. The CNA thesis will be particularly important in the formulation of NIE 11-15-84 because it could raise SLOC interdiction to a major Soviet Navy mission. This idea is anathema to expected key representatives for the NIE from DDI, DIA and Navy. We plan to ensure that the thesis receives thorough discussion during coordination.

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